{"id":4223,"date":"2011-03-19T07:14:23","date_gmt":"2011-03-19T14:14:23","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.keytlaw.com\/azllclaw\/?page_id=4223"},"modified":"2016-11-16T08:23:29","modified_gmt":"2016-11-16T15:23:29","slug":"martin-v-freeman","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/www.keytlaw.com\/azllclaw\/martin-v-freeman\/","title":{"rendered":"Martin v. Freeman"},"content":{"rendered":"<p align=\"center\"><strong>Colorado Court of Appeals &#8212; February 2, 2012<\/strong><br \/>\n2012 COA 21. No. 11CA0145. <em>Martin v. Freeman.<\/em><\/p>\n<p>Court of Appeals No. 11CA0145<br \/>\nEl Paso County Court No. 10CV1445<br \/>\nHonorable David S. Prince, Judge<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: center;\">Robert L. Martin, Plaintiff-Appellee,<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: center;\">v.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: center;\">Dean C.B. Freeman; and Tradewinds Group, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company<br \/>\nDefendants-Appellants.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: center;\">JUDGMENT AFFIRMED<br \/>\nDivision VII<br \/>\nOpinion by JUDGE NEY*<br \/>\nCasebolt, J., concurs J. Jones, J., dissents<br \/>\nAnnounced February 2, 2012<\/p>\n<p>Mulliken Weiner Karsh Berg &amp; Jolivet, P.C., Murray I. Weiner, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee<\/p>\n<p>Rothgerber Johnson &amp; Lyons LLP, Michael Francisco, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellants<\/p>\n<p>*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, \u00a7 5(3), and \u00a7 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2011.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">\u00b61 In this limited liability company (LLC) veil-piercing case, defendants, Dean C.B. Freeman and Tradewinds Group, LLC, appeal the trial court\u2019s judgment in favor of plaintiff, Robert C. Martin. We affirm.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: center;\"><strong>I. Factual Background<\/strong><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">\u00b62 Freeman managed Tradewinds as a single member LLC. Tradewinds contracted to have Martin construct an airplane hangar. In 2006, Tradewinds sued Martin for breaching the construction agreement. In 2007, while the litigation against Martin was pending, Tradewinds sold its only meaningful asset, an airplane, for $300,000, and the proceeds of that sale were diverted to Freeman, who paid Tradewinds\u2019 litigation expenses. In 2008, a judgment was entered in favor of Tradewinds. Martin appealed. Another division of this court concluded that Tradewinds\u2019 damages were speculative and remanded with directions to enter judgment in Martin\u2019s favor. Tradewinds Group, L.L.C. v. Martin, (Colo. App. No. 08CA1300, June 11, 2009) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)). On remand, the trial court declared Martin the prevailing party and awarded him $36,645.40 in costs.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">\u00b63 Because the proceeds of the sale of Tradewinds\u2019 only significant asset, the airplane, went directly to Freeman, the LLC was without any assets. Martin initiated this action to pierce the LLC veil. Following a bench trial in 2010, the trial court pierced the LLC veil and found Freeman personally liable for the cost award entered against Tradewinds. Defendants appeal.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: center;\"><strong>II. Veil Piercing<\/strong><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">\u00b64 Defendants contend that the court erred in piercing the LLC veil. We disagree.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">\u00b65 The piercing of an LLC veil is a mixed legal and factual question. See McCallum Family L.L.C. v. Winger, 221 P.3d 69, 73 (Colo. App. 2009) (standard of review for piercing corporate veil); see also Sheffield Services Co. v. Trowbridge, 211 P.3d 714, 721 (Colo. App. 2009) (veil piercing applies to limited liability companies). Defendants have not designated the trial transcripts and do not dispute the court\u2019s factual findings. We therefore accept the court\u2019s factual findings and review de novo its application of the law to those facts. See McCallum Family L.L.C., 221 P.3d at 73.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">\u00b66 To pierce the LLC veil, the court must conclude (1) the corporate entity is an alter ego or mere instrumentality; (2) the corporate form was used to perpetrate a fraud or defeat a rightful claim; and (3) an equitable result would be achieved by disregarding the corporate form. Id. at 74. The third prong, in particular, recognizes that veil piercing is a \u201cfact-specific\u201d inquiry. See id. at 79; see also Micciche v. Billings, 727 P.2d 367, 373 (Colo. 1986) (in the absence of a fully developed factual record and adequate factual findings, appellate court could not determine whether to disregard the corporate form).<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">\u00b67 Defendants contend that the court\u2019s factual findings do not support piercing the LLC veil. Specifically, they challenge the court\u2019s conclusions that the first and second prongs were satisfied. We address each prong in turn.<\/p>\n<p><strong>A. Alter Ego<\/strong><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">\u00b68 Defendants contend that the court erred in finding that Tradewinds was Freeman\u2019s alter ego. We disagree.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">\u00b69 Courts consider a variety of factors in determining alter ego status, including whether (1) the entity is operated as a distinct business entity; (2) funds and assets are commingled; (3) adequate corporate records are maintained; (4) the nature and form of the entity\u2019s ownership and control facilitate insider misuse; (5) the business is thinly capitalized; (6) the entity is used as a mere shell; (7) legal formalities are disregarded; and (8) entity funds or assets are used for non-entity purposes. McCallum Family L.L.C., 221 P.3d at 74.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">\u00b610 In concluding that Tradewinds was Freeman\u2019s alter ego, the court found:<\/p>\n<ul style=\"text-align: justify;\">\n<li>Tradewinds\u2019 assets were commingled with Freeman\u2019s personal assets and the assets of one of his other entities, Aircraft Storage LLC;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul style=\"text-align: justify;\">\n<li>\u00a0Tradewinds maintained negligible corporate records;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul style=\"text-align: justify;\">\n<li>\u00a0the records concerning Tradewinds\u2019 substantive transactions were inadequate;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul style=\"text-align: justify;\">\n<li>\u00a0the fact that a single individual served as the entity\u2019s sole member and manager facilitated misuse;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul style=\"text-align: justify;\">\n<li>\u00a0the entity was thinly capitalized;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul style=\"text-align: justify;\">\n<li>\u00a0undocumented infusions of cash were required to pay all of Tradewinds\u2019 operating expenses, including its litigation expenses;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul style=\"text-align: justify;\">\n<li>\u00a0Tradewinds was never operated as an active business; legal formalities were disregarded;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul style=\"text-align: justify;\">\n<li>\u00a0Freeman paid Tradewinds\u2019 debts without characterizing the transactions;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul style=\"text-align: justify;\">\n<li>\u00a0Tradewinds\u2019 assets, including the airplane, were used for non\u00adentity purposes in that the plane was used by Aircraft Storage LLC, without agreement or compensation;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul style=\"text-align: justify;\">\n<li>\u00a0Tradewinds was operated as a mere assetless shell, and the proceeds of the sale of its only significant asset, the airplane, were diverted from the entity to Freeman\u2019s personal account.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Defendants maintain that the court erred in finding that the first prong was satisfied because Freeman did not use Tradewinds\u2019 assets as his own. However, although the trial court recognized that \u201cmost of the examples of commingling were the use of the member\u2019s personal assets to satisfy the entity\u2019s obligations,\u201d it also noted that proceeds from the sale of the entity\u2019s only significant asset, the airplane, were diverted from the entity to Freeman\u2019s personal account.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">Defendants further argue that the court erred in not recognizing that (1) limited liability companies have fewer restrictions than corporations concerning maintaining formal corporate records, (2) member-owners are permitted to fund LLCs, (3) thin capitalization is not a reason to disregard the corporate form, and (4) third-party payment of attorney fees is proper. See, e.g., \u00a7 7-80-107(2), C.R.S. 2011 (\u201cthe failure of a limited liability company to observe the formalities or requirements relating to the management of its business and affairs is not in itself a ground for imposing personal liability on the members for liabilities of the limited liability company\u201d); 1 Fletcher\u2019s Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations\u00a7 41.35 (\u201ca sole shareholder will not likely be suspect merely because he or she conducts business in an informal manner\u201d); 2 Ribstein and Keatinge on Limited Liability Companies \u00a7 12.3 (\u201cveil piercing on the ground of inadequate capitalization is even less likely for LLCs than corporations\u201d; \u201cLLCs normally receive little funding apart from member contributions\u201d; \u201cLLCs might be distinguished from corporations regarding the likelihood that the veil will be pierced for failure to observe formalities\u201d); see also Colo. RPC 1.8(f) (allowing third-party attorney fee payment arrangements). However, the court considered the appropriate factors and its findings support a conclusion that Tradewinds was Freeman\u2019s alter ego. See also Sheffield Services Co., 211 P.3d at 720-21 (extending veil piercing to LLCs and identifying alter ego factors).<\/p>\n<p><strong>B. Defeat of a Rightful Claim<\/strong><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">\u00b611 Defendants contend that the court erred in finding that the second prong of veil piercing was satisfied because the court did not find wrongful intent or bad faith. We disagree.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">\u00b612 \u201cThe second prong of the veil-piercing test is whether justice requires recognizing the substance of the relationship between the corporation and the person or entity sought to be held liable over the form because the corporate fiction was \u2018used to perpetrate a fraud or defeat a rightful claim.\u2019\u201d McCallum Family L.L.C., 221 P.3d at 78 (quoting In re Phillips, 139 P.3d 639, 644 (Colo. 2006)). Defendants have not cited any Colorado case, and we are aware of none, establishing that a party seeking to pierce the corporate veil must show wrongful intent. We conclude that showing that the corporate form was used to defeat a creditor\u2019s rightful claim is sufficient and further proof of wrongful intent or bad faith is not required.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">\u00b613 Here, in finding that the corporate form was used to defeat a rightful claim, the court relied on Tradewinds\u2019 sale of its only asset, the airplane, and diversion of the proceeds to Freeman during the litigation with Martin. Defendants argue that the airplane\u2019s sale in 2007 does not support the second prong because Martin did not have a rightful claim until the cost award in his favor was entered in 2009. We conclude that defeating a potential creditor\u2019s claim is sufficient to support the second prong. We further conclude, as a matter of first impression, that wrongful intent or bad faith need not be shown to pierce the LLC veil.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">\u00b614 Any party engaged in litigation is exposed to potential liability. See, e.g., C.R.C.P. 54(d) (authorizing award of costs to prevailing party).<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">\u00b615 Here, Freeman drained Tradewinds of all assets during litigation, even though it was exposed to potential liability because it had sued Martin. Leaving Tradewinds without any assets would have, without a finding that veil piercing was appropriate, defeated any of Martin\u2019s potential valid claims. We conclude that transferring all of the LLC\u2019s assets to defeat a rightful creditor\u2019s potential claim is sufficient to support piercing the corporate veil. See McCallum Family L.L.C., 221 P.3d at 78 (creditor seeking to pierce the veil must show an effect on its lawful rights as a creditor resulting from the corporate form\u2019s abuse). We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err in concluding that the sale of the only asset and transfer of the proceeds to Freeman satisfied the second prong.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">\u00b616 Relying on the court\u2019s finding that, \u201cto the best of his <div class=\"fusion-fullwidth fullwidth-box fusion-builder-row-1 fusion-flex-container hundred-percent-fullwidth non-hundred-percent-height-scrolling\" style=\"--awb-border-radius-top-left:0px;--awb-border-radius-top-right:0px;--awb-border-radius-bottom-right:0px;--awb-border-radius-bottom-left:0px;--awb-overflow:visible;--awb-flex-wrap:wrap;\" ><div class=\"fusion-builder-row fusion-row fusion-flex-align-items-flex-start fusion-flex-content-wrap\" style=\"width:calc( 100% + 0px ) !important;max-width:calc( 100% + 0px ) !important;margin-left: calc(-0px \/ 2 );margin-right: calc(-0px \/ 2 );\"><div class=\"fusion-layout-column fusion_builder_column fusion-builder-column-0 fusion_builder_column_1_1 1_1 fusion-flex-column fusion-flex-align-self-flex-start fusion-column-no-min-height\" style=\"--awb-bg-size:cover;--awb-width-large:100%;--awb-margin-top-large:0px;--awb-spacing-right-large:0px;--awb-margin-bottom-large:0px;--awb-spacing-left-large:0px;--awb-width-medium:100%;--awb-spacing-right-medium:0px;--awb-spacing-left-medium:0px;--awb-width-small:100%;--awb-spacing-right-small:0px;--awb-spacing-left-small:0px;\"><div class=\"fusion-column-wrapper fusion-flex-justify-content-flex-start fusion-content-layout-column\">[Freeman\u2019s] knowledge, all of the known or reasonably possible debts of the entity were fully provided for at the time of the distribution,\u201d defendants maintain that the second prong was not satisfied. However, the court made this finding in analyzing Martin\u2019s claim that defendants violated section 7-80-606, C.R.S. 2011, because following the distribution, Tradewinds\u2019 liabilities exceeded its assets. Accordingly, that finding is not relevant to the court\u2019s veil-piercing analysis.<\/p>\n<p><strong>C. Waiver<\/strong><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">\u00b617 Defendants argue that Martin waived the ability to collect litigation costs by not contesting the amount of the cost bond that Tradewinds filed. We disagree.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">\u00b618 During the contract litigation, Martin requested that Tradewinds, an out-of-state entity, post a cost bond. See \u00a7 13-16- 101(2), C.R.S. 2011 (requiring nonresident plaintiffs to post a cost bond not to exceed $5,000). Tradewinds posted a $500 cost bond, which the trial court found sufficient. We conclude that Martin\u2019s failure to contest the cost bond did not constitute an unequivocal act manifesting intent to relinquish the right to collect costs. See Dep\u2019t of Health v. Donahue, 690 P.2d 243, 247 (Colo. 1984) (waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege and involves conduct clearly manifesting the intent not to assert the benefit). Accordingly, waiver does not apply.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: center;\"><strong>III. Attorney Fees<\/strong><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">\u00b619 Martin requests an award under C.A.R. 38(d) of the costs he incurred on appeal, including attorney fees. We conclude that this appeal is not so futile, irrational, or unjustified as to be frivolous. See Hinojos v. Lohmann, 182 P.3d 692, 702 (Colo. App. 2008); see also Mission Denver Co. v. Pierson, 674 P.2d 363, 365-66 (Colo. 1984) (C.A.R. 38(d) should be used to penalize \u201cegregious conduct\u201d). Thus, Martin\u2019s request is denied.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: center;\"><strong>IV. Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">\u00b620 A judgment is presumed to be correct until it is affirmatively shown otherwise; thus, the party asserting error on appeal must present a record that discloses the error. Dillen v. HealthOne, L.L.C., 108 P.3d 297, 300 (Colo. App. 2004); see also C.A.R. 10(b) (\u201cIf the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by the evidence or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion.\u201d). On the record before us, which does not include the trial transcript, we discern no basis for reversal.<\/p>\n<p>The judgment is affirmed. JUDGE CASEBOLT concurs.<\/p>\n<p>JUDGE J. JONES dissents.<\/p>\n<p>JUDGE J. JONES dissenting.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">\u00b621 The majority affirms the district court\u2019s decision to pierce the veil of defendant Tradewinds Group L.L.C. (Tradewinds or the LLC) and hold defendant Dean C.B. Freeman liable for a debt of Tradewinds that arose in November 2009. It does so based entirely on a transaction \u2013 Tradewinds\u2019 sale of its airplane, and the distribution of the proceeds of that sale to Mr. Freeman \u2013 that occurred more than two years earlier and bore no relationship to the debt which later arose. Were that transaction somehow wrongful, such a result might be justified. But the district court did not find that the transaction was wrongful, and its factual findings, which are uncontested on appeal, permit no such inference. Therefore, the district court\u2019s decision was, in my view, contrary to the controlling Colorado authority, which requires the party seeking to pierce the corporate veil to prove, at a minimum, wrongful conduct in the use of the corporate form. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">\u00b622 Fundamentally, \u201c[i]nsulation from individual liability is an inherent purpose of incorporation . . . .\u201d Leonard v. McMorris, 63 P.3d 323, 330 (Colo. 2003); accord In re Phillips, 139 P.3d 639, 643 (Colo. 2006); McCallum Family, L.L.C. v. Winger, 221 P.3d 69, 74 (Colo. App. 2009) (applying principles of corporate veil-piercing to a limited liability company). This treatment of a corporation as an entity separate from its shareholders, officers, and directors gives investors assurance that they can invest in and act through the corporation without being held individually liable for the corporation\u2019s obligations. Micciche v. Billings, 727 P.2d 367, 372 (Colo. 1986); McCallum, 221 P.3d at 73; see Lowell Staats Mining Co., Inc. v. Pioneer Uravan, Inc., 878 F.2d 1259, 1262 (10th Cir. 1989) (applying Colorado law); see also Cathy S. Krendl &amp; James R. Krendl, Piercing the Corporate Veil: Focusing the Inquiry, 55 Den. L. J. 1, 1-2 (1978).<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">\u00b623 \u201c[O]nly extraordinary circumstances justify disregarding the corporate entity to impose personal liability.\u201d Leonard, 63 P.3d at 330; accord In re Phillips, 139 P.3d at 644; McCallum, 221 P.3d at 74. Application of the alter ego doctrine is one means, however, by which an individual may be held personally liable for a corporate obligation. See In re Phillips, 139 P.3d at 644; Rosebud Corp. v. Boggio, 39 Colo. App. 84, 88, 561 P.2d 367, 371 (1977).<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">\u00b624 As the majority recognizes, whether to pierce the corporate veil by means of the alter ego doctrine involves a three-part inquiry. First, the party seeking to pierce the corporate veil must prove that the corporate entity is the individual\u2019s \u201calter ego.\u201d This requires consideration of many factors, but essentially asks whether the corporate form was disregarded to such an extent so as to make the corporation no more than the mere instrumentality of the individual. See Fink v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 161 Colo. 342, 350, 421 P.2d 735, 739 (1966); Rosebud, 39 Colo. App. at 89, 561 P.2d at 371; see also In re Phillips, 139 P.3d at 644 (identifying factors); McCallum, 221 P.3d at 74 (same). Second, the claimant must prove that \u201cjustice requires recognizing the substance of the relationship between the person or entity sought to be held liable and the corporation over the form because the corporate fiction was \u2018used to perpetrate a fraud or defeat of a rightful claim.\u2019\u201d McCallum, 221 P.3d at 74 (quoting in part In re Phillips, 139 P.3d at 644). Third, the court must consider whether holding the individual liable for the corporate obligation is equitable under all the relevant circumstances. See In re Phillips, 139 P.3d at 644; McCallum, 221 P.3d at 74.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">\u00b625 The district court made findings as to all three of these elements. Defendants, however, challenge only the court\u2019s findings under the first and second elements. More specifically, defendants do not challenge the court\u2019s underlying factual findings, but challenge the court\u2019s ultimate conclusions that Mr. Martin had proved the first two elements. I agree with the majority that our review of these conclusions is de novo. See McCallum, 221 P.3d at 73.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">\u00b626 As to the first element, I believe the district court\u2019s conclusion presents a close question. Some of the facts relied on by the district court and the majority do not show disregard of the corporate form, but rather were common, permissible, and unremarkable circumstances or acts consistent with (or at least not inconsistent with) proper regard for the Tradewinds\u2019 separate existence.\u00a0 Note 1. But for present purposes I accept that the first element is satisfied.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">\u00b627 As to the second element, however, I believe the district court\u2019s factual findings preclude a result favorable to Mr. Martin under the governing law, and that both the district court and the majority have applied this element in a manner inconsistent with the principle underlying it.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">\u00b628 My disagreement with the district court and the majority stems from my understanding of the requirement that the claimant prove that the corporate form was misused to perpetrate fraud or defeat a rightful claim. More precisely, because, as the district court noted, \u201c[n]o allegation of fraud is at issue in this case,\u201d the outcome here turns on the proper application of the requirement to prove misuse of the corporate form to defeat a rightful claim.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">\u00b629 Clearly, the mere fact that the creditor would not be paid absent piercing of the corporate veil is not enough. McCallum, 221 P.3d at 78 (citing Lowell Staats Mining Co., 878 F.2d at 1265). In Fink, the supreme court held that it must be shown \u201ceither that the corporate entity was used to defeat public convenience, or to justify or protect wrong, fraud or crime . . . .\u201d Fink, 161 Colo. at 350, 421 P.2d at 739; see also LaFond v. Basham, 683 P.2d 367, 369 (Colo. App. 1984) (\u201cpromote injustice, protect fraud, defeat a rightful claim, or defend crime\u201d); Rosebud, 39 Colo. App. at 88, 561 P.2d at 371. The next year, the supreme court said that there must be a showing of \u201cfraud or some other wrong being perpetrated . . . .\u201d Contractors Heating &amp; Supply Co. v. Scherb, 163 Colo. 584, 587, 432 P.2d 237, 239 (1967). And one year after that, the supreme court, quoting a much earlier case, characterized this requirement as a showing that the individual conducted business through the corporation \u201c\u2018as a means of accomplishing a fraud or an illegal act.\u2019\u201d Lavach, 165 Colo. at 437, 439 P.2d at 361 (quoting Gutheil v. Polichio, 103 Colo. 426, 431, 86 P.2d 972, 974 (1939)). In Micciche, 727 P.2d at 373, the supreme court articulated the type of conduct required as being \u201cfor the purpose of defeating or evading important legislative policy, or in order to perpetrate a fraud or wrong on another . . . .\u201d<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">\u00b630 More recent decisions have reinforced the notion that a showing of at least wrongful conduct is required. For instance, in In re Phillips, 139 P.3d at 644, the supreme court held that the claimant must prove that \u201cthe corporate structure is used to perpetrate a wrong,\u201d and that the corporate veil may be pierced \u201c[o]nly when the corporate form was used to shield a dominant shareholder\u2019s improprieties . . . .\u201d See also McCallum, 221 P.3d at 78; Sheffield Services Co. v. Trowbridge, 211 P.3d 714, 720 (Colo. App. 2009) (applying veil piercing to a limited liability company).<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">\u00b631 Though the cases contain somewhat different language, it is clear to me that the claimant must show, in the absence of blatant circumvention of a legislative policy or fraud, that the individual sought to be held liable must have misused the corporate form in a manner that, if not criminal, was at least unlawful or intended to defeat a claim. See also 1 Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations\u00a7 45.10, at 125-30 (2006) (the alter ego doctrine is intended \u201cto hold the individuals responsible for their acts knowingly and intentionally done in the name of the corporation\u201d), 144 (the plaintiff must show that the individual used his control over the corporation \u201cto commit fraud or wrong, to perpetrate the violation of a statutory or other positive legal duty, or to commit a dishonest and unjust act in contravention of the plaintiff\u2019s rights\u201d).\u00a0 Note 2.\u00a0 Any lower standard would fail to give meaningful content to the supreme court\u2019s consistent references to \u201cwrongful\u201d conduct and would make veil piercing less than the \u201cextraordinary\u201d remedy it has always been intended to be.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">\u00b632 This view is borne out by the few Colorado cases finding that the corporate veil should be pierced. For example, piercing the corporate veil has been found to be appropriate when a shareholder, officer, or director drained the corporation of funds so as to avoid paying a known creditor or a potential judgment in an existing lawsuit against the corporation. See McCallum, 221 P.3d at 79 (removal of all corporate funds to avoid paying debt owed to the corporation\u2019s lessor); Sheffield Services, 211 P.3d at 722 (manager of a limited liability company \u201cconcealed\u201d transactions and actively transferred funds for the purpose of frustrating claims against the entity); LaFond, 683 P.2d at 369-70 (president and general manager took corporate funds to avoid paying builder for home remodeling work contracted for by the corporation); Rosebud Corp., 39 Colo. App. at 86-89, 561 P.2d at 369-71 (director \u201cconverted\u201d corporate funds to avoid paying lender\u2019s promissory note).<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">\u00b633 Applying this understanding of the second element of the veil piercing test to the facts as found by the trial court, I conclude that the district court erred in piercing the LLC veil. The district court\u2019s analysis focused entirely on Tradewinds\u2019 sale of its most significant asset \u2013 the airplane \u2013 and the fact that the proceeds of that sale were distributed to Mr. Freeman. After reciting the requirement that Mr. Martin prove the corporate form was used to defeat a rightful claim, the court said: \u201cMartin\u2019s cost award goes unpaid if the entity shield is recognized.\u201d But as to the sale of the airplane and the distribution to Mr. Freeman specifically, the district court expressly found:<\/p>\n<ul style=\"text-align: justify;\">\n<li>Tradewinds sold the airplane \u201cto a third party in an arm\u2019s length transaction for a gross price of $285,000.\u201d<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul style=\"text-align: justify;\">\n<li>\u00a0\u201cThe parties are characterizing the payment of the proceeds of the sale of the airplane as a distribution to Freeman.\u201d<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul style=\"text-align: justify;\">\n<li>\u00a0\u201cFreeman was not aware of any impropriety or financial recklessness of the transfer.\u201d<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul style=\"text-align: justify;\">\n<li>\u00a0\u201c[T]o the best of [Mr. Freeman\u2019s] knowledge, all of the known or reasonably possible debts of the entity were fully provided for at the time of the distribution.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Note 3.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul style=\"text-align: justify;\">\n<li>\u201cFreeman actually and reasonably believed at the time [of the sale and distribution that Tradewinds] had more than sufficient value to cover any reasonably possible obligation on the horizon for the corporate entity.\u201d (Emphasis added.)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul style=\"text-align: justify;\">\n<li>\u00a0The distribution was lawful under section 7-80-606.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">\u00b634 The court also found that the airplane was Tradewinds\u2019 primary hard asset.\u201d Indeed, the airplane was Tradewinds\u2019 reason for existing. Once Tradewinds no longer owned the airplane, it made sense that the business would be \u201cclosed\u201d (as the district court found) and its funds taken by its sole member. It also must be remembered that the sale and transfer occurred two years before anyobligation to Mr. Martin arose. Mr. Martin did not assert any counterclaim against Tradewinds in the underlying litigation. He was, at best, a potential creditor of Tradewinds. He would have no claim against Tradewinds absent the occurrence of a far from certain contingency. And Tradewinds had posted a cost bond, the amount of which Mr. Martin never asked the court to increase, and, as the district court found, had other assets. Note 4.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">\u00b635 Viewing the district court\u2019s findings and other relevant circumstances as a whole, it appears to me that the district court concluded, in essence, that because the distribution of the proceeds of the sale to Mr. Freeman rendered Tradewinds unable to pay a future contingent obligation related to the prosecution of the litigation, the second element was satisfied. Note 5.\u00a0 The majority appears to have concluded likewise. As I hope I have made clear above, I do not believe that a mere showing of cause and effect is sufficient under the controlling authority.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">\u00b636 Thus, I conclude that Mr. Martin failed to prove that Mr. Freeman engaged in any wrongful conduct as required to pierce the LLC veil. Cf. Lavach, 165 Colo. at 436-37, 439 P.2d at 360-61 (fact that the corporation could not pay employee\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation claim did not justify piercing the corporate veil where there was not showing the corporate form was used to accomplish fraud or an illegal act); In re Death of Smithour, 778 P.2d 302, 303- 04 (Colo. App. 1989) (corporation\u2019s failure to maintain workers\u2019 compensation insurance was insufficient to hold shareholders? officers liable for injured employee\u2019s judgment against the corporation); Hill, 44 Colo. App. at 124-25, 609 P.2d at 128-29 (where shareholder loaned money to the corporation and guaranteed certain corporate debts, but there was no evidence he did so to perpetrate a fraud or promote his personal affairs, piercing the corporate veil was improper). Therefore, I respectfully dissent.<\/p>\n<p>____________________<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">1. For example, the court noted that Mr. Freeman was the sole member of the LLC. See Industrial Comm\u2019n v. Lavach, 165 Colo. 433, 437, 439 P.2d 359, 361 (1968) (fact stock is owned by a single shareholder is not grounds for disregarding the corporate entity); see also Lowell Staats Mining Co., 878 F.2d at 1263 (same). The court also noted that Mr. Freeman had contributed substantial capital to the LLC. See Hill v. Dearmin, 44 Colo. App. 123, 125, 609 P.2d 127, 128 (1980) (contributing funds to, or on behalf of, a corporation is not indicative of misuse of the corporate form). And the court also found that Mr. Freeman had received the proceeds of the airplane sale. As discussed below, however, the court found that this was a lawful distribution, and given that the sale effectively ended the LLC\u2019s business, it is logical that the sole member would receive the proceeds of that sale.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">2. As the division held in McCallum, there is no requirement that the claimant prove conduct specifically directed at the creditor. McCallum, 221 P.3d at 78.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">3. The majority discounts this finding because the court made it in the context of resolving Mr. Martin\u2019s claim under section 7-80-606, C.R.S. 2011 (which imposes limits on distributions to members of a limited liability company). But the finding was one of fact, pertaining directly to the state of affairs and Mr. Freeman\u2019s state of mind at the time of the sale. It is, in my view, the factual finding most relevant to the proper inquiry under the second element, so I do not see how it can be ignored.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">4. The majority characterizes the airplane as Tradewinds\u2019 \u201conly meaningful asset.\u201d I do not believe that characterization can be reconciled with the district court\u2019s findings. I also take issue with the majority\u2019s assertion that the proceeds of the sale were \u201cdiverted\u201d to Mr. Freeman. That term carries a connotation at odds with the district court\u2019s findings that Mr. Freeman received the funds through a lawful distribution from the LLC, with no knowledge that the LLC would be unable to pay \u201cany reasonably possible\u201d obligation.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">5. The district court did say that Mr. Freeman \u201cdrain[ed] the entity of assets such that it did not have the assets needed to pay the expenses of ongoing litigation.\u201d But it also found that Mr. Freeman continued to pay the litigation expenses. And the court also found, as discussed above, that Mr. Freeman had no knowledge of any potential claim by Mr. Martin or wrongful intent when he took the distribution.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">These opinions are not final. They may be modified, changed or withdrawn in accordance with Rules 40 and 49 of the Colorado Appellate Rules. Changes to or modifications of these opinions resulting from any action taken by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court are not incorporated here.<\/p>\n<\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Colorado Court of Appeals &#8212; February 2, 2012 2012 COA 21. No. 11CA0145. Martin v. Freeman. Court of Appeals No. 11CA0145 El Paso County Court No. 10CV1445 Honorable David S. Prince, Judge Robert L. Martin, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Dean C.B. Freeman; and Tradewinds Group, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company Defendants-Appellants. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED Division VII Opinion by JUDGE NEY* Casebolt, J., concurs J. Jones, J., dissents Announced February 2, 2012 Mulliken Weiner Karsh Berg &amp; Jolivet, P.C., Murray I. Weiner, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee Rothgerber Johnson &amp; Lyons LLP, Michael Francisco, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellants *Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, \u00a7 5(3), and \u00a7 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2011. \u00b61 In this limited liability company (LLC) veil-piercing case, defendants, Dean C.B. Freeman and Tradewinds Group, LLC, appeal the trial court\u2019s judgment in favor of plaintiff, Robert C. Martin. We affirm. I. Factual Background \u00b62 Freeman managed Tradewinds as a single member LLC. Tradewinds contracted to have Martin construct an airplane hangar. In 2006, Tradewinds sued Martin for breaching the construction agreement. In 2007, while the litigation against Martin was pending, Tradewinds sold its only meaningful asset, an airplane, for $300,000, and the proceeds of that sale were diverted to Freeman, who paid Tradewinds\u2019 litigation expenses. In 2008, a judgment was entered in favor of Tradewinds. Martin appealed. Another division of this court concluded that Tradewinds\u2019 damages were speculative and remanded with directions to enter judgment in Martin\u2019s favor. Tradewinds Group, L.L.C. v. Martin, (Colo. App. No. 08CA1300, June 11, 2009) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)). On remand, the trial court declared Martin the prevailing party and awarded him $36,645.40 in costs. \u00b63 Because the proceeds of <a href=\"https:\/\/www.keytlaw.com\/azllclaw\/martin-v-freeman\/\"> [&#8230;]<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","template":"full-width.php","meta":{"om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-4223","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO Premium plugin v27.7 (Yoast SEO v27.9) - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-premium-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>Martin v. 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